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UNDERWOOD V. STATE: GEORGIA'S 
HIGH WATER MARK  
IN THE PROTECTION OF THE BASIC 
RIGHTS  
OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS 
 
Published in The Georgia Defender, p. 2 (July 1983). 
 
Author: Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. 
Seventy years ago the Georgia Court of Appeals decided the case of Underwood v. 
State, 13 Ga. App. 206, 78 S. E. 1103 (1913). The facts of the Underwood case were 
dramatic but simple. Suspecting that the defendant Underwood was selling liquor in 
violation of the state's prohibition law, Americus police went to Underwood's store 
and illegally searched the premises without a warrant; they arrested Underwood and 
took him to the police barracks illegally and without a warrant; they forcibly and 
against his will seized certain keys from Underwood's person; and they then returned 
to the store where using the keys they opened Underwood's safe and found 114 pints 
of whiskey. Thereafter Underwood was tried and convicted, the principal evidence 
against him consisting of police testimony as to the finding of the liquor in the 
defendant's safe in his store. The holding in Underwood was simple. The Court of 
Appeals unanimously reversed the conviction on the grounds that the illegality of the 
arrest rendered the evidence obtained thereby inadmissible under the state 
constitutional self-incrimination privilege.  
Before explaining why is the best and brightest of all Georgia criminal procedure 
cases, however, it may be helpful first to relate the context and some of the interesting 
circumstances surrounding the case.  
First, Underwood was decided at a time when prosecutorial and police respect for 
constitutional rights was even worse than it is now. In 1913 prosecutors and police 
frequently failed to pay even lip service to due process principles, and dragnet arrests, 
third-degree methods to obtain confessions, and other abusive practices were 
entrenched, routine investigative procedures in criminal prosecutions. Thus, 
Underwood was decided at a time when the unconstitutional features of administering 
criminal justice seemed unalterable and permanent. In addition, the Underwood case 
was decided August 15, 1913, that is, almost simultaneously with the well-publicized 
and tragic trial of Leo Frank in Atlanta. Thus, Underwood seems in part to have 
represented a stern rebuke by Georgia's appellate judges of the sorry state of Georgia 
criminal justice then in operation.  
Third, Underwood was the most significant but nonetheless only one of a whole string 
of search and seizure decisions handed down during the first decade of the Georgia 
Court of Appeals (1907-1916) in apparent defiance of binding precedents decided by 
the Georgia Supreme Court. See generally Wilkes, "A Most Deplorable Paradox": 
Admitting Illegally Obtained Evidence in Georgia--Past, Present, and Future, 11 Ga. 
L. Rev. 105, 110-25 (1976).  
Third, Underwood involved one of two search and seizure exclusionary rules created 
long before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), extended the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule to the states. Georgia was, of course, one of the 24 states where 
illegally seized evidence was generally admissible at the time of the Mapp decision. 
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 224-32 (1960). But long prior to Mapp the 
Georgia courts fashioned two rules for excluding illegally seized evidence under 
certain circumstances. The first state exclusionary rule originated in Evans v. State, 
106 Ga. 519, 32 S. E. 659 (1899). Under Evans and its progeny evidence seized 
pursuant to an illegal arrest was inadmissible if the defendant, while being arrested or 
while under arrest, was forced by police to perform some affirmative act aiding the 
authorities in seizing the evidence, as where the defendant was forced to hand over the 
evidence. This exclusionary rule was still in effect in 1961 when Mapp was decided 
and presumably remains good law. See Grant v. State, 85 Ga. App. 610, 69 S. E. 2d 
889 (1952); see also Wilkes, "A Most Deplorable Paradox": Admitting Illegally 
Obtained Evidence in Georgia--Past, Present, and Future, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 105, 133 
(1976). The second state exclusionary rule, embodied in Underwood, barred the use of 
evidence obtained by means of an illegal arrest, even though the arrestee was not 
compelled to perform any affirmative act assisting in the seizure of the evidence. This 
exclusionary rule was created by the Georgia Court of Appeals in 1907 in seeming 
disregard of Georgia Supreme Court precedents which did not authorize suppression 
of seized evidence where the defendant had not been compelled to perform an 
affirmative act. See Hammock v. State, 1 Ga. App. 126, 58 S. E. 66 (1907); Hughes v. 
State, 2 Ga. App. 29, 58 S. E. 390 (1907). This second exclusionary rule no longer 
exists, having been abolished by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1916. See Calhoun v. 
State, 144 Ga. 679, 87 S. E. 893 (1916). But cf. Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 
S. E. 2d 169 (1964). Interestingly, both these state exclusionary rules, although 
involving illegally seized evidence, rested not on the state constitutional protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, but on the state constitutional self-
incrimination privilege.  
Turning now to the actual opinion of the court in Underwood, what are the reasons 
why the decision is such a landmark in Georgia? To begin, Chief Judge Hill's opinion 
is without any doubt the noblest, most sublime, most miltonic apostrophe in favor of 
constitutional rights ever penned in an American criminal case. Neither Justice 
Brandeis nor Justice Bradley ever wrote an opinion with passages as eloquent and 
fervent as those of Chief Judge Hill. Perhaps this why even Wigmore referred to 
Underwood as a "careful opinion by Hill, C. J." 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence Â§ 2183 n. 1, 
p. 628 (2nd ed. 1923). Although this comment may appear only modestly 
complimentary, in fact it is extraordinary coming from Wigmore, who was so 
irrationally opposed to search and seizure exclusionary rules that he was willing to 
distort their history and even to blame the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule on 
pro-German and pacifist sentiment during World War I. See Wilkes, A Critique of 
Two Arguments Against the Exclusionary Rule: The Historical Error and the 
Comparative Myth, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 881, 896-97 (1975).  
Here the key passage of Underwood:  
   
   
The two provisions of the [Georgia] constitution [protecting  
against unreasonable searches and seizures and compulsory  
self-incrimination] which we have been discussing appear in  
the fundamental law of every State of this Union, as well as  
in the Federal constitution. They are the sacred civil jewels  
which have come down to us from an English ancestry, forced  
from the unwilling hand of tyranny by the apostles of personal  
liberty and personal security. They are hallowed by the blood  
of a thousand struggles, and were stored away for safe-  
keeping in the casket of the constitution. It is infidelity to  
forget them, it is despotic to trample upon them. They are  
given as a sacred trust into the keeping of the courts, who  
should with sleepless vigilance guard these priceless gifts  
of a free government. We hear and read much of the law-  
lessness of the people. One of the most dangerous mani-  
festations of this evil is the lawlessness of the ministers of  
the law. This court fully knows and appreciates the delicate  
and difficult task of those who are charged with the duty  
of detecting crime and apprehending criminals, and it will  
uphold them in the most vigilant legal discharge of all their  
duties, but it utterly repudiates the doctrine that these duties  
can not be successfully performed without the use of  
illegal and despotic measures. It is not true that in the effort  
to detect crime and to punish the criminal, "the end justifies  
the means." This is especially true when the means adopted  
are violative of the very essence of free government. Neither  
the liberty of the citizen nor the sanctity of his home should  
be invaded without legal warrant, suspicion is no substitute  
a legal warrant, and the badge of authority is the emblem of  
law and order, and gives right to the wearer to arrest without  
warrant, imprison without authority, and torture without mercy.  
Any compulsory discovery of self-incriminating evidence is  
abhorrent to a proper sense of justice and is intolerable to  
American manhood. . . . These arbitrary methods of  
discovering crime are subversive of the fundamental  
principles of law, destructive of the indefeasible rights  
of personal liberty, personal security, and private property,  
and place at the mercy of every petty official and  
conscienceless criminal the life, liberty, and reputation  
of the citizen. . . . Therefore courts of justice will not  
approve such methods to discover crime, and the law,  
seeking pure and impartial sources of evidence, will  
refuse to admit compulsory confessions of guilt, and  
condemns as dangerous, untrustworthy, and without  
probative value testimony against others obtained by  
the use of physical torture or mental coercion. 
 
 
Underwood v. State, 13 Ga. App. 206, 213-14, 78 S. E. 1103, 1106 (1913).  
Another reason why the opinion in Underwood is so wonderful lies in the philosophy 
espoused in the opinion, a philosophy which may be pithily phrased as follows: there 
are some things more important than punishing the guilty, namely, the protection of 
human rights and dignity. Any system of criminal justice which truly follows this 
philosophy cannot possibly find itself immured in a morass of police and prosecutorial 
illegality; but rejection of the philosophy ineluctably leads to torture, the third degree, 
illegal arrests, illegal searches and seizures, and the like. If Chief Judge Hill's 
philosophy prevailed, criminal justice here and in other states would not be in its 
deplorable state and so dependent on "arbitrary methods of discovering crime."  
In America's first bill of rights, that of Virginia in 1776, George Mason wrote that 
freedom and liberty could not survive without a frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles, an admonition repeated by T. R. R. Cobb in Georgia's first bill of rights in 
1861. Insofar as criminal justice is concerned, no one ever phrased those fundamental 
principles better than Chief Judge Hill in Underwood. Hopefully, therefore, Georgia's 
criminal defense lawyers will frequently recur to the Underwood case.  
 
